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An Alternative Strategy for
Monetary Policy
In recent years considerable progress has been
made in reducing inflation in the u.s. During
1992, consumer inflation ran at about 3 percent,
the lowest rate since the mid-1960s. Federal Re-
serve officials have made it clear that reducing
inflation further, to near-zero rates, is the long-
run goal of u.s. monetary policy. Maintaining
stable prices is viewed as the main contribution
that the central bank can make to a higher rate
of economic growth over the long run.
However, the Fed's low-inflation goal does not
appear to be fully credible to the public. The
current unusually wide gap between long-term
and short-term interest rates suggests that many
participants in financial markets are concerned
that inflation will pick up again later. This same
concern is expressed in well-known surveys,
which report expectations of higher inflation over
the next ten years-around 5 percent for con-
sumers, and 4 percent for financial decision-
makers.
This lack of credibility is important because it
means that the cost, in terms of lost output and
employment, of further reductions in inflation
may be larger than would otherwise be neces-
sary. This Letter explores an approach to mone-
tary policy, involving the targeting of nominal
GOP, that could assist the Fed in achieving its
low-inflation goal and, in the process, enhance
the credibility of that goal.
The monetary aggregates
Why does the public continue to believe that
inflation will revert to higher levels inthe future?
One possibility is that persistently large federal
budget deficits may be fueling fears that ulti-
mately pressure will build for the Fed to monetize
them. Although the Fed was able to reduce infla-
tion substantially in the 1980s in the face of large
deficits, the public may not yet be convinced that
the Fed's resolve will hold firm into the distant
future.
A second possibility is that conflicting signals
coming from the monetary aggregates in recent
years have meant that the public has had a hard
time monitoring the thrust of monetary policy to
be sure that the Fed's commitment to low infla-
tion remains intact. Since the mid-1970s, the Fed
has established ranges for, and reported to Con-
gress on, several monetary aggregates. The Fed
followed the approach of gradually reducing the
growth rate targets for the aggregates over time
as a way to pursue gradual disinflation. Until
1983, a narrow aggregate, Ml, was emphasized;
since then, a broader aggregate, M2, has re-
ceived most attention.
Unfortunately, the quality of the signals about the
thrust of policy emanating from these aggregates
has been garbled by financial innovation. The
creation of new monetary and non-monetary in-
struments has altered the relationships between
the various aggregates and spending in the econ-
omy, and this has made it difficult for the public
to judge whether the Fed is maintaining its com-
mitment to low inflation.
Developments in recent years illustrate this prob-
lem, since the various aggregates have sent con-
flicting signals. M1 has grown very rapidly, in-
ducing some observers to worry about a surge in
inflation in the future. At the same time, M2 has
grown sluggishly, suggesting to others that policy
has been too restrictive.
Nominal GOP
Given these problems with the aggregates, it
seems worthwhile to investigate alternative
approaches. One alternative would be for the
Fed to set a target for nominal GOP, which is a
measure of the aggregate demand for goods and .
services produced in the economy. This variable
is appealing as an intermediate target because it
has had a fairly consistent long-run relationship
with price indices over the years. The only devel-
opments that could disrupt that relationship are
unpredicted changes in the aggregate supply
of goods and services, or potential real COP.
Although this variable is by no means perfectly
predictable, it tends to evolve slowly. In particu-
lar, unexpected movements in aggregate supplyFRBSF
generally are far smaller than those that have
affected the relationship between the monetary
aggregates and prices.
The major problem with adopting nominal GOP
as an intermediate target is the difficulty in con-
trolling it in the short to medium term. In part,
this is because the relatively long lags from mon-
etary policy actions to changes in nominal GOP
make it difficult to offset the effects of unexpected
shocks. As a consequence, the Fed could not be
held accountable for controlling nominal GOP
even over periods as long as a year. Hence it
would be difficult for the public to monitor the
Fed's actions by observing nominal GOP and
comparing it to the target.
A solution to this problem can be found in a
strategy of monetary policy originally proposed
by Professor Bennett McCallum of Carnegie-
Mellon University. First, the central bank would
establish and announce a target path for nominal
GOP that would be consistent with the economy
operating at its long-run potential and with infla-
tion equal to the targeted rate. Second, the cen-
tral bank would define a rule that would specify
what monetary policy actions it would take when
nominal GOP misses its target. These monetary
policy actions, in turn, would be defined by
changes in a policy instrument, such as a short-
term interest rate or a measure of bank reserves.
It is important that the instrument be subject to
the close control of the central bank in the short
run, so that it can be held accountable for follow-
ing the rule.
An example of such a rule would be that each
quarter the central bank would change the fed-
eral funds rate by a specified proportion of the
nominal GOP target "miss" in the prior quarter.
If nominal GOP were above the announced tar-
get, whether because of faster-than-expected
inflation or real GOP growth, the funds rate
would be raised. Conversely, if nominal GOP
were to fall below target, policy would be eased.
The rule would be set up such that if it were fol-
lowed consistently over time, there would be a
high probability of achieving the nominal GOP
target (as well as the inflation goal) over the long
term, even though there might be significant de-
viations in the short run. Thus for the public to be
confident that the long-run inflation target would
be achieved, the central bank would need only
to achieve the instrument settings defined by
the rule.
Historical analysis
We have examined how the u.s. economy might
have performed over the past 30 years if such a
rule had been in place (Judd and Motley 1992).
We carried out counterfactual simulations under
various sets of assumptions regarding the struc-
ture of the economy and how monetary policy
was set. We first assumed that the instrument of
monetary policy is the monetary base, which con-
sists of the stocks of currency held outside the
banking.system and of bank reserves. Our em-
pirical analysis suggested that the Fed could have
maintained stable prices over the 30-year period
if it had followed such a rule-based strategy. Even
if the economy had been hit by random shocks
that were as variable as those that actually oc-
curred, there was a high probability that prices
wouId have ended the period at about the same
level as at the beginning.
However, except for a short period in the early
1980s, the Fed generally has preferred to conduct
policy by manipulating a short-term interest rate.
In part, this preference reflects concern that if it
controlled the stock of bank reserves or the mon-
etary base closely, interest rates would become
excessively volatile. Moreover, a high proportion
of u.s. currency is held abroad today, which
casts doubt on a strategy that uses the base as
an instrument to control aggregate demand in
the u.s. economy.
Hence, we also analyzed the effects of a regime
in which the policy instrument is a short-term
interest rate, such as the federal funds rate. We
found that a rule-based strategy using an interest
rate instrument was likely to cause extreme fluc-
tuations in the economy if the level of nominal
GOP were targeted. Th~ problem appears to be
that the lags from changes in the interest rate to
the level of nominal GOP are so long that policy
was not able to prevent the economy from sub-
stantially overshooting its target in response to
shocks. Such overshooting tends to set off cycles
of ever increasing amplitude.
However, our results suggest thJt this volatility
could be avoided if the interest rclte were
changed only in response to the growth rate of
nominal GOP. Since the growth rate of nominal
GOP could be returned to target more quicklyReference
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is operating above its long-run capacity and
nominal interest rates are held constant, a surge
in inflation will have the effect of lowering real
interest rates and so stimulating the economy
even more.
So long as the instrument settings indicated by
the rule were achieved on average over time, the
rule would work to achieve the long-run inflation
objective. Moreover, once the public began to
see that the rule was being follo'vved, the Fed's
credibility would be enhanced. This would make
it easier to maintain stable prices without causing
undue disruption to real economic activity.
If the Fed were to use a rule to specify its base-
line policy, this problem could be mitigated. The
rule would provide information as to the direc-
tion the interest rate should be moved to keep
the economy on a stable growth path with low
inflation. Although the Fed could, at its discre-
tion, choose to modify the policy indicated by
the rule, a debate that focused on whether policy
should ease or tighten relative to what the rule
suggested might be more useful than one that
focused only on whether the interest rate should
be changed from its recent level. In particular,
putting the debate into such a framework could
help policymakers make short-run discretionary
decisions without losing sight of the long-run








Given that it is impossible to foresee all future
circumstances, central banks are understandably
wary of committing themselves to rigid adher-
ence to any rule, no matter how sensible that
rule may seem to be. However, a rule such as the
one under discussion may make a contribution to
policy even if it were used only to modify the
Fed's traditional discretionary approach. At pres-
ent, the Fed evaluates alternative policy actions
relative to a status quo policy of holding nominal
interest rates unchanged. Naturally, the discus-
sion tends to focus on whether the funds rate
should be raised or lowered from its recent level.
This may be misleading, because leaving the
funds rate unchanged does not necessarily imply
that the effect of policy on the economy also will
remain unchanged. For example, if the economy
However, a rule that aimed at a target for the
growth rate, rather than the level of nominal
GOP, would automatically accommodate shocks
to the level of nominal GOp' and thus would
allow for the possibility that the price level might
drift over time. In other words, it would not
guarantee precise control of the average rate of
inflation over long periods of time. Such drift
would occur only if there were a prolonged se-
ries of positive or negative shocks. However, on
the rare occasions when this occurs, it could be
offset by one-time adjustments to the level of the
targeted nominal GOP growth path. Thus this
problem would not be insurmountable.
than its level, the problems of instability are
avoided. We found that a rule defined in terms
of the growth rate of nominal GOP could, with a
high degree of probability, keep inflation low
without causing excessive fluctuations in output.
In fact, the variance of real GOP would be about
the same as under the policies actually followed
over the last 30 years, while the volatility of inter-
est rates would be reduced somewhat.
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